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Townend: Oil Interests as Securities: The Enumerated vs. the General Defin

OIL INTERESTS AS SECURITIES: THE ENUMERATED vs.
THE GENERAL DEFINITION
The securities laws are being violated daily by persons who are unaware
14
that the oil and gas interests in which they are dealing are securities."
The primary reason for such unintentional violations is the inadequacy of
the state and federal securities laws which define a security by providing
examples of specific interests that are per se securities and also by use of
general definitions. 1 5 The purpose of enumerating various interests was to
include by name or description many documents which had a well settled
meaning and in which there was common trading for investment purposes.""6
Some interests, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, have a standardized meaning, and the terms alone were sufficient to identify them as securities. The
multifarious types of oil rights which constitute securities, however, presented
a unique problem to the draftsmen. 1" 7 To include every oil right by name
would have encumbered the security definition, but it was also evident that
it was impossible to draft an enumerated definition broad enough to encompass every oil right which was a security. For example, a "fractional undi'
vided interest in an oil, gas, or other mineral rights"""
does not include
1
9
within its meaning an entire oil lease,
which under certain circumstances
is a security. If the entire lease is to be a security, it must come within
the meaning of another term of the security definition. A second enumerated interest that has been used in an attempt to deal with oil and gas interests as securities but which is often of little value in determining whether
a particular oil right is a security is a "certificate of interest in an oil, gas,
or mining title or lease.' 120 Unlike a "fractional undivided interest in an
oil, gas, or other mineral rights," which describes an interest, a "certificate
of interest" describes a document in which an interest is transferred. This
enumerated interest provides no guidance in determining whether the oil
interest which is transferred in the instrument is a security. For example,
every mineral deed is a "certificate of interest" but not every oil interest
transferred in the deed is a security. To determine whether the oil inter114. Meer, The Securities Laws and Oil and Gas Financing, 20 TEX. B.J. 211, 212
(1957).
115. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); see SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
116. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
117. Id. at 352.
118. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
119. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943).
120. Corporate Securities Law, ch. 384, § 1, stats. 1919, as amended, CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 25019 (Deering Supp. 1973).
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est which is conveyed is a security, a more searching inquiry beyond the
form of the document is required.' 2 '
Several courts have failed to recognize the fact that the enumerated oil
interest in the definition of a security was never intended to encompass every
oil security, thereby erroneously concluding that unless the oil right in question is specifically enumerated, then no security is involved. The fact overlooked in these decisions is that if the enumerated interest is inapplicable,
the oil right under consideration may nevertheless be a security within the
meaning of the general definitions. Underlying the decisions of the courts
that follow this narrow approach is the doctrine of "ejusdem generis." This
convenient maxim of statutory construction which constricts the general
terms to those specifically set out in the security definition was summarily
rejected in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.122 In this landmark decision,
the Supreme Court held that oil interests which did not fit the specific designations were nevertheless not precluded from answering to the general descriptions of "investment contract" or "any interest or instrument commonly
23
known as a security.'
In the line of cases which follows the liberal approach taken in Joiner,
the courts have consistently applied the term "investment contract" and disregarded the phrase "any interest or instrument commonly known as a security." The reason for this preference is derived from the precedent set
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.," 4 wherein an "investment contract" was given
a definitive meaning, and a "common security" was virtually ignored. The
Court in Howey defined an "investment contract" as a "scheme whereby
a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of others.' 25 There is a striking similarity
between this definition and that of a "common security," which has been
defined as "an investment of money with the expectation of profit through
the efforts of others.' 1 26 Professor Joseph Long describes the Howey test
127
of an "investment contract" as the result of a "crazy-quilt development,'
in which the definition of a "common security" was inadvertantly merged
with the definition of an "investment contract.' 128 The Howey test of an
investment contract in effect merely expanded the definition of a common
121. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943).
122. 320 U.S. 344, 351 n.8 (1943). For a critical look at the ejusdem generis doctrine see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula? 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 367, 405-06 (1967).
123. SEC v.C.M.Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
124. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
125. ld. at 299.
126. SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 622 (1939).
127. Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" To The Mainstream of
Securities Regulations, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 139 (1971).
128. Id. at 146-159.
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security by adding the elements "common enterprise" and "solely from the
efforts of others." Although the Howey decision would seem to be expanding the scope of the general definition of a security, there has been a tendency of the courts to apply the test mechanically, requiring that each tech12
nical element be satisfied.'
The courts have not taken uniform approaches in determining whether
a particular interest is a security. However, despite this lack of uniformity,
four distinct points of view can be delineated. In the first approach, the
courts follow a strict view, holding that unless the oil right in question is
enumerated in the definition of a security, then no security is involved. A
more flexible outlook is reflected in those decisions where an oil right which
is not within the meaning of the enumerated interest may nevertheless be
deemed to be a security within the general terms. In the third line of cases,
the question presented is whether the oil right is a "certificate of interest
in an oil, gas, or mining lease." Because this enumerated interest merely
describes the form of the document, the courts have resorted to the general
terms, usually the "common security," to ascertain whether the interest
which is transferred is a security. A fourth approach can be identified in
court decisions which do not even consider whether the enumerated interest
may be applicable, but directly apply the term "investment contract."
APPROACHES TAKEN IN DECIDING WHETHER
AN OIL RIGHT IS A SECURITY

The Strict View
The basic rule of law which can be extracted from the cases following
the strict view as to whether a particular interest is a security is 'that an
oil right cannot be considered a security unless it is within the meaning of
the enumerated oil interest under the definition of a security. The inadequacy of this rigid rule can be illustrated by examining two cases
that reached contrary results in deciding the question of whether an oil lease
was a security within the meaning of a specific definition.
1. Oil Leases in General. In Kadane v. Clark"0 the question of whether
an unlicensed lease broker could recover commissions earned in selling oil
leases turned on whether an oil lease was a "certificate or any instrument
representing any interest in or under an oil, gas, or mining lease, fee or
title.' 3'1 The court held that the leases were specifically within the enuumerated definition. 1 2 It should be noted, however, that this enumerated
129. See discussion concerning strict application of Howey test at 136-41 supra;
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulations, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 139 (1971).
130. 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940).
131. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (1964).

132. Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 500, 143 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1940); accord,
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interest merely describes the form of the document in which an oil security
can be transferred, and therefore does not provide a test for ascertaining
whether the oil interest conveyed is a security. Not every sale of an entire
oil lease involves the transfer of a security,1 33 but the approach taken by
the court foreclosed any inquiry into the nature of the lease sales. 134 This
inquiry could have been accomplished by applying the "common security" test, i.e., if the lease agreements contemplated that the transferee was to
rely on the efforts of others to produce a profit, then the leases would be
considered as securities. The limited approach taken in Kadane was also
taken in State v. Allen, 13 5 but with contrary results. In Allen, certain sellers
offered oil leases in New Mexico to buyers in North Carolina. The court
held that oil leases were not within the meaning of a "certificate of interest
in an oil, gas, or mining lease," and whether the definition of a security
should be amended to include sales or assignments of oil, gas, or mining
leases was for the legislature to decide. 13 6 This conclusion, although contrary to Kadane, is equally unacceptable. Under this view, many lease
agreements which would satisfy the test of an "investment contract" or a
''common security" will escape the reach of the Act.
2. Working Interests in Leases. This narrow view of requiring the interest in question to specifically come within one of the enumerated interests is also evident in cases considering whether an undivided share of the
working interest in a lease is a "certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining
lease, royalty or title." The working interest is the lessee's interest in the
lease (usually 7/8). 137 If the lessee is in need of financing, shares of the
working interest are sold to investors, who in turn contribute a pro-rata share
of the drilling costs, and are entitled to share in the profits. In Smith v.
Wedding, 13 a seller actively engaged in speculative oil ventures sold undiLack v. Borsun, 44 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. La. 1942); Mecom v. Hamblen, 155 Tex.
494, 500, 289 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1956); Muse v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 622, 625, 132
S.W.2d 596, 597 (1939); Atwood v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 543, 547, 121 S.W.2d 353,
360 (1938); Flournoy v. Ghallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1945, no writ). The Act does not protect sellers of leases against buyers, and is therefore inapplicable to the purchase of a lease. Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263,
270, 167 S.W.2d 735, 738 (1943); Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 644, 161 S.W.2d
478, 481 (1942).
133. Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961).
134. In some cases, the name of the document itself, such as a stock, bond, or note,
sufficiently identifies it as a security. In others, the inquiry must go outside the instrument. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943).
135. 5 S.E.2d 844 (N.C. 1939).
136. Id. at 846-47.
137. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 469-70 (2d ed. 1961); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 441.1, at 544 (1973); Bloomenthal, SEC
Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing,7 WYo. L.J. 49, 58 (1953).
138. 303 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1957).
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vided fractional working interests in oil and gas leases to the investors. In
considering whether the oil interests were within the enumerated interest,
the court stated:
It is a primary rule of statutory construction that the enumeration of
particular things excludes the idea of something else not mentioned.
A working interest is not mentioned specifically . .

We conclude

that a working interest was not intended by the legislature to be covered by the provisions of the statute. 139
Although the court did not explicitly mention it, the doctrine of "ejusdem
generis" was invoked. This "handy Latin aphorism"'140 was rejected in SEC

v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,' 41 wherein the Court refused to read out of

the statute the general designations merely because more specific ones had
been used to reach some kinds of interests. 1 42 In Smith, the court apparently failed to note the prior holding in Joiner, and therefore did not consider the application of the general terms.
Another mandate of the United States Supreme Court-that the form of
the agreement is to be disregarded for the substance143-was ignored in
Hammer v. Sanders.'44 In that case, the sellers used cleverly drafted letter
agreements, in which both a share of the working interest and a development contract were included. The agreements provided that although a
share of the working interest was transferred, the only payments presently
due were for the development contract. The court concluded that because
the only money presently due was for the development contract, the share
45
of the working interest was transferred incidentally to the drilling contract.'
Because agreements to exploit potential oil lands were not enumerated in
146
the definition of a security, the court found that no security was sold.
As Judge Davis indicated in his dissenting opinion, the court failed to look
through the form of the agreement and consider whether an investment contract was involved.' 4 7 He argued that such a hypertechnical analysis would
48
give rise to simple methods of circumventing the Act.'
139. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
140. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula? 18 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 405 (1967).
141. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
142. Id. at 351.
143. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
144. 134 N.E.2d 509 (Ill.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
145. Id. at 513.
146. Id. at 514.
147. Id. at 516 (dissenting opinion). Professor Sterling argues that Hammer is
wrong in both reasoning and result. He contends the majority simply would not allow
astute businessmen to reap the tax benefits of the successful wells and make the defendant pay for the failures. Sterling, Impact of State and Federal Securities Acts on Everyday Oil and Gas Transactions, EIGHTH ANNUAL OIL & GAS LAw & TAX. INST. 33,
59(1957).
148. 134 N.E.2d 509, 517 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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As can be seen, some confusion has arisen as to whether an undivided
share of the working interest in a lease satisfies the enumerated oil interest
in the definition of a security in the Securities Act of 1933, which refers
to a "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights
.. . .- 9 The weight of authority supports the conclusion that shares of
the working interest in a lease are securities within the enumerated definition, 1 0 but there are cases which appear to hold to the contrary. The confusion may be attributed in part to a failure by some courts to separate
the question of whether the seller is an "issuer" from the question of whether
the interest transferred is a "security." An "issuer" of fractional interests
in oil and gas is "the owner of any such right or of any interest in such
right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests therein
for the purpose of public offering."''
An issuer of a security is subject
to the registration requirements of the Act.' 5 2
The determination of whether the seller is an "issuer" is not conclusive
in deciding whether a security has been transferred,' 5' because a non-issuer,
although exempt from registration requirements, may be subject to liability
under the anti-fraud provisions of the Acts' 54 as a seller of a security. 55
In several recent cases this distinction was not noted. In Creswell-Keith,
Inc. v. Willingham,'" the transferor of an entire one-eighth share of the
working interest in a lease contended that the Securities Act was intended
to cover only those situations wherein a person creates fractional interests
in oil and gas leases for the purposes of making a public offering, and does
not apply where a person merely sells to another an entire undivided interest.157 The court took an equivocal position:
The Court is inclined to agree that the Act may not have been intended to apply to such sales, but [the statutory definition of a secu149. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970).

150. Accord, Nor-Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. McBride, 143 F. Supp.
562, 563 (M.D. Tenn. 1956); Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Neb. 1954),
aff'd sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955).
151. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1970).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970) does not exempt an issuer from the registration
requirements of the Act provided for in § 77e.
153. There can be a transfer of a "security" without an "issuer." 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 472 n.5 (2d ed. 1961).
154. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 780(c)(1)-(2) (1970); Uniform Securities Act, §§
101, 410(a)(2) 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4902, 4940 (1973); SEC Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. 240, lOb-5 (1972).
155. Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1947); Coffey, The Economic
Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula? 18 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 367, 371 (1967).
156. 160 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Ark. 1958), rev.'d on other grounds, 264 F.2d 76 (8th
Cir. 1959).
157. id. at 739.
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rity] ... in no uncertain terms provides that the term "security" includes any "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
158 mineral
rights," and such fractional interests are involved in this action.
Because this was an action for rescission under the anti-fraud provisions of
the Act, the court need not have even considered the defendant's contention.
The court could have disposed of the seller's assertion by stating that it was
only relevant to the question of whether the seller was an issuer under the
provisions for registration, and had no bearing on whether the interest sold
was a security.
In two recent cases the confusion was compounded. Not only were the
"issuer" and "security" questions merged, but the courts attempted to determine whether an entire oil lease was a security within the meaning of a
"fractional undivided interest in an oil, gas, or other mineral rights." In
Woodward v. Wright,'5 9 the seller transferred the entire working interest
(15/16) in an oil lease. It should be noted that the sale of an entire working interest is equivalent to the sale of the entire lease.' 60 In considering
whether a security was involved, -the court discussed the application of the
enumerated interest, and the definitions of an "issuer" and a "security" stating:
Not every transaction involving the sale of a fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights is ipso facto the sale of
a "security" within the meaning of the Act.' 6 '
There are two problems with this statement. The first is the application
of the enumerated interest to the sale of an entire lease. A 15/16 interest is
in essence an entire oil lease except the 1/16 portion which was reserved
to the lessor. Therefore, the court should not have considered whether an
entire oil lease was a fractional undivided interest in an oil, gas or other
mineral rights, but should have applied the general terms "investment contract" or "common security."' 62 The second problem with the court's statement is that it is subject to two interpretations. If what is meant is that
not every sale of a "fractional undivided interest" is subject to the registration requirements of the Act, then it is undoubtedly correct. But if interpreted to mean that not every "fractional undivided interest" is a security,
then it is incorrect. This language cannot be read separately from the language regarding an "issuer"
158. Id. at 739.
159.

266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).

160. In a recent case, the sale of a 7/8 ths interest in the lease was equivalent to
an entire lease. See Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 824 (1961).
161. Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112 (10th Cir. 1959).
162. In a recent case the sale of a 7/ths interest in the lease was not considered
a security within the enumerated interest. If the lease was to be a security it had to
be within the general term investment contract. Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435,
437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961).
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[W]hen the definition of a "security" as it relates to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, is considered in pari
materia with the definition of an issuer of fractional interests in oil
and gas as "the owner of any such right or of any interest in such
right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests
therein for the purpose of a public offering. . ..
It follows, we think,
that a fractional undivided interest in oil and gas becomes a "security" when it is created out of the ownership of an interest in oil and

gas or other mineral rights for the purpose of sale or offering for sale. 163
By considering the definition of a security in pari materia with the definition
of an issuer the court in Woodward has merely added to the confusion as
subsequent decisions illustrate. For example, the language of Woodward
was cited in Lynn v. Caraway,'4 where an entire working interest in a lease
(7/8) was sold:
It therefore follows that not every transaction involving the sale of
a fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights is
necessarily the sale of a "security" under the Act. It is only that interest which is created by subdivision of a portion of the owner's interest
for the purpose of a public offering for sale which is reached by the
Act. Thus if the seller transfers the whole of what he owns, there
can be no creation of the interests by him, as "issuer," such as would
be counted "securities" within the meaning of the Act. 16 5
The correct interpretation of Lynn is that if the seller does not split-up the
interest he owns, whether whole or fractional, but transfers the entire interest, then he is not an issuer and is exempt from the registration requirements. However, Lynn can also be cited for the proposition that if the
seller owns a fractional interest in the lease (e.g., 1/8), and transfers the
entire interest without subdividing it, then no security is involved. This interpretation was supported in SEC v. MacElvain,'"3 wherein the court cited
Lynn as holding that "if one transfers outright an entire interest in an oil
and gas lease, no sale of a 'security' is involved."' 6 7 Insofar as this statement relates to the transfer of an entire fractional interest in the lease, it
is incorrect. This right is a security within the enumerated interest of the
security definition, regardless of whether the seller splits-up the fractional
interest or sells it in its entirety.' 6 8 The confusion in this area could be
resolved if the "security" and "issuer" questions are considered separately.
The Broad View
In several decisions, the courts have expanded the scope of the inquiry
163.
164.
165.
166.
denied,
167.
168.

Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112 (10th Cir. 1959) (emphasis added).
252 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. La. 1966), afj'd, 379 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 861.
299 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D. Ala.), afj'd, 417 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
397 U.S. 972 (1970).
Id. at 1353.
See cases cited note 150 supra.
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beyond the applicability of the enumerated interest, and have considered
whether the oil right in question is a security within the general terms. This
view was originally adopted in the landmark case of SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp. 6" There, the leaseholders offered assignments of small oil
leases to nearly a thousand prospects, many of whom were induced to purchase the leases by the promises of the sellers that a test well would be
drilled. The sellers urged that because the definition of a security mentions
"fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights," it
excluded sales of entire oil leases. Although the enumerated interest was
inapplicable, the Court refused to limit the inquiry to the applicability of
the specific terms:
We cannot read out of the statute these general descriptive designations
merely because more specific ones have been used to reach some kinds
of documents ....
. . . We do not think the draftsmen thereby immunized other forms
of contracts and offerings which are proved as matter of fact to answer
to such descriptive terms as "investment contracts" and "securities.' 170
Because the entire agreement contemplated that the investors were not to
rely on their own input to develop the leases, but were merely to share
in the discovery values which might follow the exploration enterprise, the
Court concluded that the instruments were within the meaning of "investment contracts" or "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.' ,171
In Joiner these general terms were not given a definitive meaning, but
in a subsequent landmark decision, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 1 72 an "investment contract" was given a rather technical meaning involving a scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.' 78
Since the Howey decision, many courts which purport to adhere to the broad
approach taken in Joiner in reality have taken a more rigid view. When
the question presented is whether an oil right which is not within the enumerated interest comes within the general terms, these courts have not only
applied the term "investment contract" to the exclusion of the other definitions, but have also applied the Howey test strictly. 7 4 One case which demonstrates the practice of excluding other general terms from consideration
169. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
170. Id. at 351-52.
171. Id. at 351; accord, Price v. United States, 200 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1953);
Mansfield v. United States, 155 F.2d 952, 54-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Browne v. United States, 329 U.S. 792 (1946).

172. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
173. Id. at 299.
174. E.g., Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 824 (1961); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667, 671-72 (N.D.

Tex. 1957).
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is Roe v. United States.175 In that case a mail campaign was conducted
to sell to large numbers of persons oil leases on small tracts of land in Texas
and Utah. The offerings described in the letters promised great wealth to
the investors. The court phrases the issue as follows:
There was not, therefore, any sale, offer of sale, or delivery of a "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights" . . . .
Nor did such oil leases fit within any other specifically itemized interests. If they are to come within
the term "security" they must do
176
so as an "investment contract."'
The court thereupon held that because the prospective purchaser was offered
a chance to reap great rewards solely because of the activities of others,
the instruments were "investment contracts."'' 77 In Roe, the general terms
"certificate of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement" and
"any interest or instrument commonly known as a security" were disregarded
in accordance with Howey, where these general terms were also ignored.
In a recent case a court has not only restricted the question to the application of the term "investment contract," but also has applied the Howey
test narrowly. In Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 7 8 oil leases to land
in Utah were sold to Texas residents, but there was no evidence that the
sellers made any representations that a test well would be drilled, or any
other promises which would have induced the purchasers to buy. It
appeared the investors merely hoped that the leases would appreciate in
value and could later be re-sold at a profit. In considering whether the
oil leases were investment contracts, the court discussed the Howey test and
emphasized its elements of "common enterprise" and "reliance upon the sole
efforts of the promoter."' 17 9 These elements, however, were not found to
exist because
the investors had absolute dominion and control over the property acquired, and because there were no elements of a common enterprise
in the transaction it is reasonable to conclude that the lease assignments
in the instant case were not "investment securities" ... .180
The difficulty with Darwin is not in the result, because the leases would
not have been considered securities within the less-rigid common security
test-an investment of money with the expectation of profit through the
efforts of others. The investors in Darwin did not rely on others to produce
profits. The error is in the method. By applying the Howey test mechanically, requiring that each technical element be satisfied, the court has liter175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 439-40.
153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672 (court's emphasis).
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ally invited ingenious promoters to devise oil securities which will circumvent one of these elements, thereby escaping the reach of the Securities Acts.
Certificates of Interest

When the enumerated interest merely describes the form of the instrument, the courts have resorted to the general terms for proper guidance in
determining whether the oil interest which is transferred is a security. A
"certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining lease" does describe the document in which an oil security is transferred, but it fails to provide the court
with an adequate standard by which to distinguish which "certificates of interest" are securities. This difficulty was effectively pointed out in Moore
v. Stella, 181 where the issue raised was whether mineral deeds, in which fractional tracts of prospective oil lands were conveyed, were securities:
Section 2(a)7 of the Act includes in the definition of the word "security" "any . . .certificate of interest in an oil, gas or mining title
or lease," and the decisive question is whether the deeds issued to
plaintiff fall within that definition. A deed to mineral rights may or
may not be a security. The determination of its true character requires
an inquiry which goes beyond the mere name of the instrument or
the nature of the interest conveyed.
In deciding whether a given instrument is a security the courts have
invariably looked through mere form to substance. 18 2
A "certificate of interest" differs from a "fractional undivided interest" because the former describes only the document, and not the interest which
is transferred in the instrument. Since a "certificate of interest" was applicable to every transaction in which an oil right was being conveyed, the
court in Moore had to rely on the general definitions to distinguish those
instruments in which an oil security was transferred. In formulating its own
test, the court stated:
The question . . . which is determinative . . .was whether . . . the

scheme under which the deeds were given contemplated and involved
investment by the purchasers in an enterprise or venture conducted
by others for earnings and profits. . ...83
Without explicitly referring to it as such, the court applied the common security test. In considering whether the deeds were securities, it was necessary
to inquire into the mutual purposes and expectations of the parties, 8 4 and
the common security test provided the court with a meaningful formula for
ascertaining their intentions. The court concluded that it was highly improbable that the investors intended to develop the small parcels themselves,
181.
182.
183.
184.

127 P.2d 300 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
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because the tracts were not of sufficient size to justify expensive exploratory
drilling. Therefore, it could be inferred that all of the buyers intended to
lease their mineral lands back to the sellers, who would, in turn develop
the minerals for the investors.18 5 It is interesting to consider the wording
of the court's conclusion: "We are of the opinion that the . . . mineral deeds

were "certificates of interest" in an oil, gas or mining title and were therefore
'securites' . . . ."186 This wording gives rise to a deceptive conclusion because it implies -that the enumerated interest was the guiding test. A clearer
version of the holding in Moore is that the transaction involved the sale
of a security, because the mineral deeds were "certificates of interest" which
satisfied the common security definition.
87
This approach has been uniformly followed by the California courts.'
In one recent case, Oil Lease Service, Inc. v. Stephenson," 8 the test laid
down in Moore was followed, but the court also applied other general terms.
In Stephenson the seller offered to use his skill and knowledge in selecting
government leases for the investors. He also assured the buyers that the
leases selected would be favorable for oil development, and that when oil
was discovered, the investors would be able to re-assign the leases at a large
profit. In determining whether the transaction involved the transfer of a
security, the court applied the "common security" test:
It is settled law that any deed, certificate of interest or like instrument
of conveyance or assignment falls within the act only when it appears
directly or inferentially that the buyer contemplates receipt of profits
from activites of other persons .... 189
Applying this test, the court found that the investors' profits did not depend
on their own efforts, but entirely on the efforts of others-first, on the seller
to select favorable leases and, second, on an oil company to drill and discover oil on that land. 190 In its conclusion, the court not only applied the
common security test to bring the instruments within the enumerated interest, but also held that the interests were within other terms of the security
definition:
[W]e have used this test to determine the true character of the instruments . . . and looking through their legal form we find, in reality,
185. Id. at 303.
186. Id. at 303.
187. The basic test is whether the investor receives a right to share in the profits
or the proceeds of a business enterprise or venture to be conducted by others. People
v. Sidwell, 162 P.2d 913, 916 (Cal. 1945); Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 134 P.2d 777,
782 (Cal. 1943); Domestic & Foreign Petro. Co. v. Long, 51 P.2d 73, 77 (Cal. 1935);
Oil Lease Serv., Inc. v. Stephenson, 327 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev.Corp., 282 P.2d 574, 578 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955);
People v. Chait, 159 P.2d 445, 455 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); People v. Rubens, 54
P.2d 98, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
188. 327 P.2d 628 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
189. Id. at 633.
190. Id. at 633.
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certificates of interest in oil leases and assignments thereof, investment
contracts and collateral trust certificates .... 191
The application of the Moore-Stephenson approach is preferable when the
enumerated interest in the definition of a security merely describes the form
of the document. Without having to struggle with the meaning to be afforded the enumerated interest, 192 a court, by applying the common security
test, can focus on the essential element of a security-the mutual expectation of the parties that the investor is to rely on others to produce a profit
or other value.
Direct Application of the General Definitions
In the fourth line of cases, the general terms have been directly applied
without any prior consideration of whether the oil interest enumerated in
the security definition may be applicable. One reason for this approach
is that the enumerated oil interest within the security definition has not been
specifically defined, while the term "investment contract" has been given
a very definitive meaning in Howey. Indicative of this preference for the
term "investment contract" is Meihsner v. Runyon,193 where the question
presented was whether an undivided 1/64th interest in a 7/8th or working
interest in a lease was a security:
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether or not the
instruments or interests are securities . .

.

. The applicable provisions

of the Illinois Securities Law of 1919 are as follows:
"The word 'securities' shall mean

.

. .

any oil, gas or mining lease,

royalty, or deed, 94
and interest, units or shares in any such lease,
royalty, or deed.'
The court, however, did not attempt to consider the applicability of this
specific definition. Instead, the Howey test was cited as controlling the
issue:
In determining whether a particular instrument is a security within
the meaning of the statute, we must look to the substance of the transaction and the relationship between the parties ....
The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money
enterprise with profits to be derived solely from the efforts
in a common
95
of others.'
The court could have concluded that the fractional shares of the working
interest were securities within the meaning of the definitional enumerated
191. Id. at 635.
192. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula? 18 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 369 (1967).
193. 163 N.E.2d 236 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1960).
194. Id. at 239.
195. Id. at 239-40.
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interest as "units or shares in any such lease," instead of holding that the
interests satisfied the Howey test.
The preference for the term "investment contract" was obvious in two
recent cases wherein the enumerated interest was not even cited within the
opinions. In SEC v. MacElvain,196 the defendants offered to sell 1/16th
interests in mining claims to mineral rights in submerged lands off the coast
of California. The purpose of selling these interests was to raise money
for an expensive court fight with the United States Department of the Interior which would decide whether the defendants had a superior right to
the claims. The defendants made it clear in their offerings that the litigation
would inure to the benefit of the investors. The court found that -this promise created an expectation that profits would accrue from the efforts of a
third party; therefore, the court held that the offerings were investment contracts. 197 The court did not attempt to decide whether the enumerated oil
interest was applicable, but relied exclusively on "investment contract." In
the recent decision of Buie v. United States,' 98 a similar approach was taken.
In that case, sellers 'bought up oil and gas leases at a reduced price and
sold interests in them by falsely presenting that the leases had great potential
for production. The court relied exclusively on the term "investment contract," without mentioning the enumerated interest, in determining that the
transactions involved the transfer of a security because the leases depended
for their value upon services to be performed exclusively by the sellers.' 99
The exclusive reliance on the term "investment contract" has caused the
other terms of the security definition to become obscure. In a recent case,
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,'20 0 the court relied on the "investment
contract" test, but recognized the fact that other terms of the security definition were also applicable. In that case, the defendant stockbroker sold an
oil production payment to Johns Hopkins University for $1.3 million. The
sale of the oil payment entitling -the investor to receive a fixed portion of
the oil and gas produced was secured through the seller's guarantees that
the transaction would be profitable. Relying on Howey, the court first held
that the interest was an "investment contract,"'20 I and in addition, that the
enumerated interest and another general term were applicable:
[T]he fact that the Hopkins production payment is an "investment
contract" does not exclude the possibility that it may also be a "frac196. 299 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D. Ala.), ajj'd, 417 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970).
197. Id. at 1353.
198. 420 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 932 (1969).
199. Id. at 1209.
200. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), modified on appeal, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th
Cir. 1970).
201. Id. at 1216.
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tional undivided interest
20 2 in oil, gas or other mineral rights" or even
a "profit sharing plan."
It is interesting to compare this language to the cases which hold that an
oil right cannot be considered a security unless it is within the meaning of
enumerated interest. Clearly, the approach taken in Johns Hopkins is preferable because the general terms of the security definition provide the court
with a more meaningful standard than does the enumerated interest in deciding whether a particular oil interest is a security.
The various approaches taken by the courts in deciding whether an oil
right is a security is a result of the uncertainty surrounding the purposes
and the definitions of the enumerated interests. These specific designations
are not all inclusive, but were merely intended to serve as examples of those
oil rights in which there was common trading for investment pruposes. The
trend has been to rely on the general -term "investment contract," principally
because Howey firmly established its meaning. The Howey test of an investment contract is viable, however, only so long as it is flexibly applied.
Unfortunately, the "investment contract" element of the securities definition
has been the only general term to be given a definitive meaning, which
accounts for the exclusive reliance on the definition by the courts. Perhaps
an elucidation of the terms "certificate of interest or participation in any
profit sharing agreement" and "any interest or instrument commonly known
as a security" will afford the courts the additional guidance and flexibility
required in order to give full effect to the purposes of the securities laws.
202. Id. at 1216-17 (citations omitted).
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